Intergenerational equity is increasingly argued to be a child rights issue because climate change affects children in particular ways. In this post, I present this legal and theoretical development and argue further for why intergenerational equity could in fact be considered a ‘childist’ concept. Childism is a theoretical perspective developed by philosopher John Wall, which deconstructs the inherent adultism in society. Childism embraces a view of humanity as interdependent, recognising all people not only as human beings, but as human becomings. I argue that we could consider this idea of human subjects as ‘becomings’ not only as applying to living people, but across (past, present and future) generations. The concept of intergenerational equity can thus both strengthen childism theory as well as take ‘intergenerational equity as a child rights issue’ further than the legal sphere.
Emerging arguments on the links between intergenerational equity and children’s rights
In the famous Sacchi et al vs. Argentina et al petition to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, it was argued that the State Parties of Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany and Turkey were
…shifting the enormous burden and costs of climate change onto children and future generations. In doing so, they have breached their duty to ensure the enjoyment of children’s rights for posterity, and failed to act in accordance with the principle of intergenerational equity. No state acting rationally in the best interests of the child would ever choose to delay and impose this burden upon them. As such, the respondents have each violated the petitioners’ right under Article 3 to have children’s bests interests be made a primary consideration in their climate actions and omissions (para. 28).
The petition makes effortless links between ‘children,’ ‘future generations,’ ‘posterity,’ ‘intergenerational equity,’ ‘the best interest of the child,’ ‘climate actions and emissions,’ and the standing of the petitioners who were all young people. Yet, there are important conceptual knots that need to be tied out: are children future generations? Do they represent future generations, and if yes, why? Why should intergenerational equity be considered a child rights issue?
First of all, let’s untangle the concept of intergenerational equity. Although used by others earlier, its main theorisation can be attributed to Edith Brown Weiss. She argued that present people have obligations towards future generations to preserve the earth and its resources in the same condition it was left to them. Her argument did not emphasise children in particular, and neither has much subsequent theory on intergenerational equity coming from legal or philosophical angles. Such scholarship focuses instead on a partnership between generations, and on intergenerational equity as a defining part of ‘sustainable development.’ The principle has become a guiding principle of environmental law, even argued to be customary international law.
The global surge of youth climate activism has intensely been using the language of ‘rights of future generations’ and ‘intergenerational equity’ (or ‘intergenerational justice’). When these movements began engaging in litigation, they also used the language of children’s rights, as we saw above with the Sacchi et al. petition. Such developments have in turn sparked scholarship on the relations between intergenerational equity and children’s rights, most notably by Aoife Daly. Daly has argued that intergenerational rights are children’s rights because children are a crucial link between present and future generations. She demonstrates how international legal frameworks around children’s rights, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, can and should be used to strengthen legal arguments on intergenerational equity in the fight against climate change.
As a contribution to this debate, I argue that while recognising the link between children’s rights and intergenerational equity is useful – especially if we are searching for legal arguments and advancements – we should not lose sight of intergenerational equity as a solidarity principle putting responsibility on all of us. In particular, if we look at the concept through the lens of John Wall’s ‘childism,’ we can understand intergenerational equity in new and promising ways.
Childism and its possible contributions to intergenerational equity
Childism is a theoretical perspective developed by John Wall with the ambition to be a prism we can apply to analysing social structures in the same way that we effortlessly apply feminism. If we see the world through a feminist lens, we realise, and potentially dismantle, patriarchal structures. Similarly, if we look at the world with a childist lens, we discover adultist structures to potentially dismantle. Just as feminism has critiqued classic human rights theory for in fact being the rights of men, we can also look critically to much child rights theory and discover that much of it is seeking to accommodate children into an adult world. In contrast, a childist approach recognises that a third of humanity are children, and that they are integral to society. Therefore, children should also be integral to the way in which we theorise about society. Wall argued that a childist prism allows us to not think of humans as ‘independent,’ but rather ‘interdependent,’ a life experience which is most acute in childhood, but in fact is present across ages. Similarly, while much child rights scholarship argues that children should be seen as human beings and not becomings, Wall turns this around and argues that we should all be seen as human becomings.
At first sight, intergenerational equity does not emphasise children, as discussed above. But if we seek to deconstruct the concept with a childist lens – that is, seeking to uncover its adultist biases – it becomes rather difficult. While many human and child rights-related concepts – such as ‘voting rights’ or ‘child participation’ – can easily be critiqued to view the world through an adultist lens, ‘intergenerational equity’ seems in fact to not be particularly adultist. It does not take its point of departure in a world in which the ‘real’ subject (i.e. the one our theorisations reflect) is an individual adult. Instead, the subject in intergenerational equity theory is humanity at large, and ‘generations.’ Children and adults alike fit easily into both subject categories. Thinking of the human subject as a fluid movement of generations can be seen as analogous to considering us all human becomings, as Wall does. Conservation of options, quality and access – the three key principles in Weiss’ theory – are indeed applicable across ages and not adult-biased.
Intergenerational equity is furthermore very much about duties towards other people, in particular towards other generations. From a childist perspective, duties of care for others during certain stages of life – such as early childhood – are a crucial part of life. When it comes to duties, however, we should be careful not to place responsibility upon the shoulders of younger generations - even if only a rhetorical one - simply because these generations use ‘intergenerational arguments’ alongside ‘youth arguments’ in their climate activism and litigation. Intergenerational equity is a solidarity principle based on partnership between generations due upon every human presently living on earth. We can use child rights law to strengthen our arguments, just as we can use human rights law more broadly. But youth should not become a poster child of a burden and a fight that we should all fight.
If intergenerational equity is a child rights issue, it does not only mean that we can find connections between environmental law and child rights law, but also that we more fundamentally can rethink climate justice by combining the frameworks of intergenerational equity and childism. Doing so has potential to think of climate justice not only as a ‘child rights issue’ in the legal sense, but also to create a framework for solidarity across generations, which recognises the experiences of children as an interdependent part of society.
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